« Hur svårt är det att hitta i städer? | Main | Extreme Martial Arts »
augusti 18, 2004
Om anseende (spelteori)
I blogganteckningen When Reputation Systems Are Worse Than Useless sammanfattar och diskuterar Paul Resnick ett spelteoretiskt paper skrivet av Jeffrey Ely, Drew Fudenberg och David K. Levine kring anseende. Se nedan för referens och abstract till papret.
Så här börjar blogganteckningen:
A paper by Ely, Fudenberg, Levine, titled When is Reputation is Bad?, analyzes mathematical models of situations where public reputations make it harder, not easier, to sustain good behavior. I'll start with their example of a car mechanic who prefers to be honest but will occasionally be tempted to take an unfriendly action in order not to be mistaken in the long run for a crooked mechanic. Then I try to summarize their findings about the class of situations that lead to this kind of problem.
Papret är Jeffrey Ely, Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine:
When is Reputation Bad? (PDF).
Abstract:
In traditional reputation theory, reputation is good for the long-run player. In "Bad Reputation," Ely and Valimaki give an example in which reputation is unambiguously bad. This paper characterizes a more general class of games in which that insight holds, and presents some examples to illustrate when the bad reputation effect does and does not play a role. The key properties are that participation is optional for the short-run players, and that every action of the long-run player that makes the short-run players want to participate has a chance of being interpreted as a signal that the long-run player is "bad." We also broaden the set of commitment types, allowing many types, including the "Stackelberg type" used to prove positive results on reputation. Although reputation need not be bad if the probability of the Stackelberg type is too high, the relative probability of the Stackelberg type can be high when all commitment types are unlikely.
Posted by hakank at augusti 18, 2004 08:10 EM Posted to Spelteori och ekonomi